Iraq

Last week's meeting between President Bush and Yevgeny Primakov, Mikhail Gorbachev's special emissary to Iraq, generated much speculation about a possible Soviet diplomatic initiative to end the Gulf crisis. Those expectations were overblown. While Primakov provided Bush a first-hand account of his discussions in Baghdad with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein

For now, the Bush administration eschews the use of force while preparing for its use. But what will happen if a consensus develops that President Bush's diplomatic and economic approach is ineffective while a full-scale attack on Iraqi forces remains unattractive? As an additional buildup of U.S. forces gets underway

The recent violence in Jerusalem has again raised fears that Iraq can utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict to break the coalition opposed to its aggression. An accurate assessment of Saddam Hussein's support among non-Iraqi Arabs is critical to understanding this question, as well as the impact of the Gulf crisis on

"Will sanctions against Iraq work?" is a question too ambiguous to be useful. It leaves unspecified such key issues as what we want sanctions to accomplish and how Iraq would react if sanctions started to pinch. And, then, how much does Saddam Hussein care about what happens to Iraq's economy

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is using the Gulf crisis as a catalyst for farreaching changes in Moscow's Middle East policy. Moscow is putting the emphasis on improving relations with the West and with the wealthy Persian Gulf states at the expense of Arab radicals. Shevardnadze's UN speech was remarkable

Saddam Hussein's threats to attack Israel or Saudi oil fields if sanctions begin to strangle him must be taken seriously by defenders of those purported targets but are most likely bluffs to forestall the mounting pressure on Iraq and raise his subjects' morale. It is not clear that Iraq has

The danger of a U.S.-Iraq military confrontation may be receding for the time being. But now the debate in the administration, Congress, and the public faces a new issue: will the Bush Administration's multilateral strategy prevent it from taking unilateral military action if Saddam Hussein refuses to withdraw from Kuwait

Since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq has intensified, expanded, and diversified its effort to enhance its strategic capabilities, including efforts to develop or acquire unconventional weapons, long-range strike systems, and strategic reconnaissance systems. Iraq has traditionally aspired to be a regional power and its new strategic capabilities provide